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WILLIAM E. BUTLER*

Some Recent Developments In
Soviet Maritime Law
To those who recall the vigorous advocacy of the traditional three-mile
limit of territorial waters by the United States delegation to the 1958 and
1960 Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea, the recent disclosure by
the Legal Adviser to the Department of State that the United States would
support an international convention fixing the territorial waters of all countries at twelve miles may have come as a considerable surprise.' While the
United States position is predicated upon securing appropriate guarantees
of innocent passage through international straits, it nonetheless constitutes
an unexpected shift in American maritime policy.
Equally dramatic is the changed attitude of the Soviet Union-principal
antagonist of the Western maritime powers at the Geneva Conferences-toward the law of the sea. Historically a partisan of a twelve-mile
breadth of territorial waters and of a broad concept of historic waters, the
Soviet Union urged at Geneva that coastal states should fix the limits of
their jurisdiction seaward in conformity with their security, economic, and
other interests. Many Western observers concluded that the USSR sought
to appropriate vast areas of adjacent seas under the pretext of
historic-bay, "closed"-sea, and territorial-sea doctrines, and they viewed
such claims as evidence of an aggressive Soviet posture toward the West.
When the 1960 Geneva Conference failed to reach agreement on the
breadth of the territorial sea, the Soviet Government unilaterally enacted a
twelve-mile limit and denied to foreign warships the right of innocent
passage in Soviet territorial waters.
*J.D. (Harvard), Ph.D. (Johns Hopkins); Member of the District of Columbia Bar;
Member, Committees on Soviet Law and on the International Control of Atomic Energy,
American Bar Association; Editor, Soviet Statutes and Decisions; Research Associate, Harvard Law School, 1968-70; Reader in Comparative Law at the University of London, 1970-;
author, The Law of Soviet Territorial Waters (1967); co-editor, The Merchant Shipping Code
of the USSR (1968) (1970).
This article is a revision of an address delivered by the author at the Command and Staff
College, Navy Division, of the Federal Republic of Germany in August 1969. A more
extensive treatment of the subject is his forthcoming book, The Soviet Union and the Law of
the Sea, to be published in early 1971 by the Johns Hopkins Press.
19 Int'l Legal Materials 434 (1970).
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The present writer has argued elsewhere that these Soviet doctrines
were more properly attributable to historic Russian maritime legal policy,
to profound Soviet naval weakness and the relegation of the Navy to a
coastal-defense role in Soviet strategic doctrine, to predominantly coastal
commercial fishing operations, and to dependence upon foreign merchant
fleets to carry goods. 2 But indications of basic alterations in long-standing
Russian and Soviet interests at sea are accumulating, and these are beginning to affect Soviet attitudes toward the law of the sea.
In 1961, the large and sophisticated Soviet high-seas fishing fleet appeared off the New England and Alaskan coasts of the United States,
Soviet fishing vessels began operating in the Gulf of Alaska in 1962, in the
Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean in 1962-63, off Oregon and Washington
in 1966, California in 1967, and Hawaii in 1968. By the late 1960s, Soviet
fishery activity had been instrumental in persuading the United States
Congress to create a twelve-mile fishing zone and had brought the USSR
into diplomatic confrontations with Argentina, Ghana, and other states. At
the same time, the Soviet Government endeavored to curtail Japanese
fishing off Soviet coasts in the Okhotsk Sea and the Sea of Japan.
Moreover, following the demonstration of American naval superiority
during the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet leadership accelerated naval and
merchant marine shipbuilding programs begun in the mid-1950s, being
determined, one may speculate, never again to be at such a disadvantage.
The Soviet merchant marine is now of respectable size, and one of the
most modern fleets on the oceans. The Soviet Navy is increasingly being
regarded as a formidable potential adversary.
The impact of these developments upon Soviet attitudes toward the law
of the sea has been gradual, at times barely perceptible, but nonetheless
significant and far-reaching. This is perhaps best illustrated by comparing
traditional Soviet positions on vital maritime questions with recent Soviet
writings and policies.
Territorial Sea
In the pre-1917 period, the Tsarist Government frequently expressed
attitudes toward the legal regime of the seas at variance with the practices
of the major Western seafaring powers, particularly with regard to the
extent of coastal jurisdiction over adjacent seas. Generally speaking, Russia supported the cannon-shot rule as a flexible and realistic criterion for
measuring coastal jurisdiction at sea. While both the cannon shot rule and
the three-mile limit were incorporated into Russian legislation and treaty
practice of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, on several occa2

Butler, The Law of Soviet Territorial Waters (1967).
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sions the Russian Government attempted to adopt a broader limit or
protested that the breadth of territorial waters was unresolved in international law.
In the first decade of the twentieth century, a series of commissions
appointed by the Tsarist Government to study the issue, recommended
that Russian territorial waters be extended to at least six and, in one case,
up to twenty miles. Higher officials, however, concluded that a unilateral
extension of territorial waters would be unacceptable to the major seafaring
states, and elected to pursue a graduated approach by creating coastal
zones for special purposes. Thus, in 1909 a customs belt of twelve miles
was established, and in 1911 an exclusive twelve-mile fishing zone was
created off the far eastern coast of Russia. The establishment of each zone
was strenuously protested by Great Britain and Japan, who were apprehensive that Russia was asserting a jurisdiction broader than that provided for
in the decrees. The United States, among others, construed the Russian
3
legislation narrowly and entered no objection.
Thus, on the eve of the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian Government
had rejected the three-mile limit of coastal jurisdiction as a principle of
customary international law, apparently had observed that principle for the
most part in state practice, and had established two twelve-mile zones for
special purposes. Whatever its long-range intentions may have been, the
Tsarist Government did not promulgate or enforce a twelve-mile belt of
territorial waters, notwithstanding subsequent assertions by Soviet jurists
to the contrary.
Broadly speaking, the Soviet approach to territorial waters falls into
three periods. In the immediate post-revolutionary period until 1947, the
law of Soviet territorial waters did not differ markedly from that of the
West. At international conferences, the Soviet Government adhered to the
position of the Tsarist Government that there was no generally recognized
breadth of territorial waters in international law. In practice, however,
Soviet normative acts adopted different limits for different purposes. For
example, a decree of 1921 established a twelve-mile fishing zone in certain
Arctic waters and closed the White Sea to foreign fishing; 4 a 1928 decree,
still in force, created a ten-mile zone regulating the use of wireless radio
equipment; 5 and a 1927 statute on the state boundary fixed a twelve-mile
belt of coastal jurisdiction but did not specify that a belt of territorial
waters had been delimited. 6 A Soviet jurist, writing in 1939, confirmed this
31bid. at 3-6.
46 Soviet Statutes & Decisions 26 (1969).
51bid. at 95.
6
1bid. at 30.
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interpretation of Soviet legislation: "USSR legislation does not define the
breadth of territorial waters of the Soviet Union

. .

." but "establishes

border and customs zones, fishing zones, zones for the use of radio equip7
ment, fortified zones, and zones closed to navigation."
Following World War 11, Soviet patrol vessels began to enforce strictly
the twelve-mile fishery zone against Japanese and Scandinavian vessels. In
the ensuing diplomatic correspondence exchanged with governments of
the aggrieved vessels, it became clear that the USSR was now interpreting
the 1927 statute on the state boundary as having established a twelve-mile
belt of territorial waters, although legislative language and prior Soviet
practice did not support such a position.
During this same period, Soviet jurists stressed the desirability of using
the term "territorial waters" in place of the term "territorial sea" because
the former expression more correctly reflected the nature of the waters and
the connection of the maritime belt with the territory and internal waters of
the coastal state; in other words, it suggested a greater degree of coastal
state sovereignty over territorial waters. 8
Soviet jurists who, prior to 1940, had interpreted Soviet legislation as
providing for contiguous zones, were criticized for mistaken and harmful
views which "weaken our position in the struggle for the sovereign rights
of the USSR in its territorial waters," and which "help our adversaries in
their struggle against us, and in their attempts to violate the regime of our
Soviet territorial waters." 9 From this time forward, Soviet jurists began to
insist that the USSR had always applied the twelve-mile limit, which
supposedly had been fixed by the Tsarist customs decree of 1909.
The right of innocent passage experienced a similar evolution. Prior to
1945, Soviet law and practice with respect to the right of innocent passage
generally conformed to Western practice. Thereafter, Soviet jurists questioned the existence of such a "right". The most extreme position was
taken by A. N. Nikolaev, a jurist who served as a member, and later
deputy chairman, of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Conferences on
the Law of the Sea.
In 1954, Nikolaev contended that innocent passage contradicted state
sovereignty over territorial waters, and gave an opportunity to aggressive
blocs to commit hostile actions against the coastal state under the guise of
innocent passage. Hence, he concluded, passage of foreign non-military
7

V.A. Belli, writing in a naval international-law manual published in 1939, cited by A. N.
Nikolaev, Problema territorial'nykh vod v mezhdunarodnom prave 202 (1954).
8
The strongest proponent of the view, Nikolaev, published a monograph in 1969, entitled
"The Territorial Sea". The expressions territorial "waters" and "sea" have both been used in

recent Soviet legislation.
9

Nikolaev, op. cit., at 199.
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vessels must not only be innocent but also necessary from the viewpoint of
customary navigation.
Nikolaev's position, it must be added, was not pressed by the Soviet
delegation at Geneva. The head of the Soviet delegation acknowledged that
his Government favored recognition of the right of innocent passage as one
of the essential conditions of normal international navigation.
The Soviet Union did seek to have some of its postwar doctrinal attitudes toward the regime of territorial waters adopted during the Geneva
Conferences, especially the twelve-mile limit and restrictions on the right
of innocent passage for warships. The Conferences were unable to resolve
either issue, and in signing the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone the Soviet Government entered a reservation to Article
23(d) to the effect that a coastal state has the right to establish an authorization procedure for the passage of foreign warships through its territorial
waters.10
The postwar period culminated in 1960 with Soviet ratification of the
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, and with the adoption of two
basic legislative acts affecting the regime of territorial waters. The first, a
Statute on the Protection of the State Boundary of the USSR, explicitly
codified the twelve-mile limit as the breadth of Soviet territorial waters,
defined the nature and conditions of innocent passage, and otherwise implemented the Geneva Convention.' The second legislative enactment,
the Rules for Foreign Warships Visiting the Territorial Waters of
the USSR, provided that consent for the passage of foreign warships into
Soviet territorial waters must be requested through diplomatic channels

thirty days prior to the proposed

Visit.12

These Rules enacted into law the

Soviet reservation to Article 23(d) of the Convention on the Territorial
Sea.
Within the past year or so, there have been indications that a new phase
is emerging in Soviet attitudes toward the law of territorial waters. The
Soviet Government is re-examining its postwar positions. To be sure, there
will be no retreat from the twelve-mile limit. But as the Soviet Union
grapples with the implications of its newly-acquired status as a major
maritime power, other changes are perceptible. Soviet jurists, for example,
have recently urged the convening of a third conference on the law of the
sea to agree upon a maximum breadth of territorial waters permissible
under international law. The Soviet view now is that twelve miles is the
3
absolute maximum limit.'
106 Soviet Statutes & Decisions 63 (1969).

"Ibid. at 45.
121bid. at 65.
' 3 See A. L. Kolodkin, "Territorial Waters and International Law," International Affairs
[Moscow], No. 8 (1969), pp. 79-81; A. N. Nikolaev, Territorial'noe more (1969).
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Similarly, the Soviet attitude toward the archipelago theory has changed
from one of qualified endorsement to cold disapproval. One suspects,
although such a view has not yet been expressed publicly in Soviet legal
media, that the USSR would accept a carefully defined right of innocent
passage for all vessels through international straits in order to reach agreement on the breadth of territorial waters.
Closed Sea Doctrine
The notion of the closed sea is not a Soviet invention. 14 It dates back at
least to John Selden, author of Mare Clausum (1635). Tsarist jurists often
referred to the Caspian Sea as the prototype of the closed sea, and from
time to time in the interwar period Soviet diplomats urged that the Black
and Baltic Seas be closed to warships of nonlittoral states. The full-fledged
theory of the closed sea originated in postwar Soviet diplomatic correspondence with Turkey over the future status of the Montreux Convention
of 1936 governing the Black Sea straits. In 1948 this view was given an
elaborate jurisprudential rationale by a Soviet jurist named Dranov, who
asserted that for historical, juridical and geographic reasons, the coastal
states were entitled to have the decisive voice in regulating a closed sea. In
1951 a young Soviet international lawyer, S. V. Molodtsov, applied Dranov's thesis to the Baltic Sea. Later the doctrine was extended to the
Okhotsk Sea and the Sea of Japan.
In its original Soviet version, the closed-sea doctrine held that the
coastal states were entitled to the exclusive use of, and jurisdiction over,
the entire sea. By the mid-1950s, Soviet jurists had learned that such a
view would be quite unacceptable, and the doctrine underwent numerous
refinements. At present, Soviet legal theorists suggest that a closed sea
must be characterized by: (1) a particular geographic configuration of the
coastline; (2) the proximity to the coast of a limited number of states whose
land territory fully encloses the given expanse of sea; (3) a comparatively
narrow entrance to the sea; (4) the absence of significant international
maritime routes through the sea. The merchant vessels of noncoastal states
would have the same rights as those of coastal states, all being governed by
the regime of the high seas. Warships of noncoastal states would have no
right of access to a closed sea, whereas warships of coastal states would
enjoy a right of free and unlimited navigation in closed seas beyond the
territorial waters of other littoral states. The right of vessels of non-coastal
powers to fish has been left open.
Even from this brief summary of the closed-sea doctrine, it is apparent
14

Butler, op. cit., at 19-26.
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that it was devised primarily to protect Soviet coasts from the large navies
of non-coastal powers. The doctrine still retains some vitality, for the
USSR annually suggests to the Baltic states that they establish a regional
regime for the Baltic Sea. One would also suspect that the USSR invoked
the closed sea doctrine in 1968, when protesting against visits by US naval
vessels to Turkish ports on the Black Sea.
Nevertheless, there is a serious question as to whether, apart from the
Baltic and Black Seas which have a distinctive historical and geopolitical
status, the closed-sea doctrine will continue to be compatible with Soviet
maritime interests. Although Soviet jurists have carefully tailored the
closed-sea doctrine exclusively to Soviet coasts, there is always the danger
that other states may seize upon the doctrine in order to justify the
exclusion of Soviet vessels from their coasts. Soviet fishing flotillas would
be especially vulnerable to such a policy.
In this connection it is highly significant that a volume on maritime law
published last year in the USSR is the first in more than two decades to
omit a general discussion of the closed sea. 15 While this omission probably
does not signify a total abandonment of the notion, it is unlikely that the
doctrine of the 1950s will long survive.
Historic Waters
Both Russian and Soviet publicists have long regarded historic bays and
seas as part of the internal waters of a coastal state, subject to its unlimited
sovereignty. Some Soviet jurists have classified a given body of water as
both a closed sea and an historic bay -i.e., the White Sea. Until the early
1950s, the White Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the Gulf of Riga were
commonly cited by Soviet jurists as examples of the historic bay. In 1951 a
Soviet textbook on international law added the category of the historic sea,
referring specifically to the Kara, Laptev, East Siberian and Chukotsk
Seas. All of these, it was argued, were actually large bays of the Arctic
Ocean, a view which, geographically and geologically speaking, has some
merit.
Although none were designated by name, historic bays and seas were
expressly included within USSR internal waters by the 1960 Statute on the
Protection of the State Boundary of the USSR. Under this statute, a
historic bay or sea is one having special economic or strategic significance
for the littoral state, or as having been established by historical tradition.
Although the definition is so stated that any one of the factors would
appear to justify invocation of the doctrine, Soviet writers attempt to
5

1 A. A. Volkov, Morskoe pravo (1969).
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establish the presence of all three when defending the designation of a body
of water as "historic."
The single instance of a formal application of the historic-bay principle
occurred in 1957, when the USSR Council of Ministers decreed that Peter
the Great Bay, the site of Vladivostok, which is a major naval base only
ten miles from the Chinese border, was part of the internal waters of the
USSR. 16 The decree was promptly endorsed by the People's Republic of
China, although vigorously protested by several Western powers. The Bay
had never before been mentioned by any Soviet writer as an historic bay.
In this case, too, Soviet endorsement of the historic-bay principle, particularly as espoused in the 1950s, appears to have been influenced by
considerations of security. Taken together, the historic bay and closed sea
doctrines as formulated by Soviet jurists in the 1950s would effectively
close ten of the fourteen seas washing Soviet coasts, to foreign influence
and navigation. However, the historic-bay or sea doctrine as applied to the
Arctic coastline of the USSR has been challenged effectively by the voyages of United States Coast Guard icebreakers into the Kara and
Chukotsk Seas since 1963. Although the Soviet Government objected to
the passage or armed icebreakers through the Vil'kitskii Straits, which, like
the passage from the Kara to the Laptev Seas, are overlapped by Soviet
territorial waters, on the ground that the icebreakers as naval warships had
not obtained authorization for such passage pursuant to Soviet law, the
legal theory of historic waters was not elevated into a state claim.' 7 Under
the historic-waters theory, foreign vessels would be wholly barred from the
region since the waters in question would be internal waters. The return to
a more traditional listing of historic waters (White Sea, Peter the Great
Bay), based upon Soviet legislation, contained in a 1969 maritime law
textbook, may signify the final demise of the historic-waters theory with
regard to the Arctic seas.' 8
Continental Shelf

The theory of the continental shelf made its appearance in Russian state
Soviet Statutes & Decisions 209 (1969/70).
17This is an excellent example of the necessity to distinguish between Soviet doctrine and
practice. On many occasions Soviet legal theory is strongly influenced, indeed is often directly
inspired by, positions taken by Soviet diplomats in international conferences or organizations,
or in bilateral diplomacy. However, on other occasions Soviet jurists write what in effect is a
brief for changing the law to accord with Soviet interests; and in the latter case their
theoretical positions may or may not accord with state practice or represent official views.
And increasingly Soviet international lawyers express views which clearly are personal and
are not necessarily shared by their own colleagues. Western readers of Soviet legal media
often overlook these exceedingly important distinctions.
' 8 Volkov, op. cit., at 119.
166
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practice as early as 1916. In that year the Russian Government employed
the term "plateforme continentale de la Sib6rie" to justify a claim to certain
19
islands north of Siberia in a memorandum to several governments. The
Soviet Government referred to the "plateau continentale sib6rien" in a
1924 note reaffirming the claim of 1916.20
Soviet legal literature paid little attention to the legal status of the shelf
until 1950, when V. Koretskii, who retired in 1970 as the Soviet judge on
the International Court of Justice, wrote an article surveying the claims
which various states had made to the shelf. Koretskii was critical of claims
where "expanses of sea are usurped and are transformed into national
waters." During the deliberations of the International Law Commission,
and later at the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, the Soviet
Government took a generally moderate approach toward most of the issues
at stake. It supported exclusive coastal-state right to use the wealth of the
shelf, while opposing any extension of that right to support a claim to
superjacent waters. It opposed the application of the regime of the high
seas to the shelf, on the grounds that the strongest capitalist powers would
acquire an undue share of shelf resources.
However, full sovereignty over the shelf was objectionable as being
incompatible with the interests of nonlittoral states in fishing and freedom
of navigation. During the 1958 Geneva Conference, and again in recent
disarmament negotiations, the USSR strongly supported demilitarization of
the shelf; i.e., use of the shelf exclusively for peaceful purposes.
In February 1968 the USSR adopted an edict on the continental shelf;
this was the first Soviet legislative act defining the legal status of the shelf
to
beyond the twelve-mile belt of Soviet territorial waters and was intended
21
Shelf.
Continental
the
on
implement the provisions of the Convention
The 1968 edict incorporated verbatim the definition of the shelf set forth
in the Convention on the Continental Shelf, while resolving an ambiguity in
that Convention as to whether huge depressions or trenches constituted the
outer boundary of the shelf or whether the shelf-mass beyond the depression should also be deemed part of the shelf. In adopting the latter view,
the Soviet Government undoubtedly had in mind the several sizable
troughs intersecting portions of the polar seas off Soviet coasts.
The Soviet definition of the shelf included the so-called "exploitability"
clause of the Convention on the Continental Shelf with regard to the outer
boundary of the shelf; i.e., the shelf extends to a depth of 200 meters or,
beyond that limit, to the depth at which technology permits exploitation.
196 Soviet Statutes & Decisions 255 (1970).
20
21

Ibid. at 256.
Ibid. at 258.
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Soviet jurists interpreted this provision to mean that the most technologically advanced state in the world determines the outer boundary of
the shelf for all states as it develops its own shelf at ever-greater depths. To
do otherwise, Soviet jurists contend, would enable advanced states to
explore the seabed and subsoil off the coasts of other countries at a depth
exceeding their own continental shelf. This would "contravene the spirit of
the Convention on the Continental Shelf, which leaves to each state the
right of exploration and exploitation of areas of its seabed and subsoil . .. ,, However, the application of the principle would not extend, in
the Soviet view, to the deep ocean bed beyond the geological continental
shelf.
The problem of delimiting the boundary of a shelf shared by two or more
states has already been dealt with in Soviet treaty practice pursuant to
Article 6(2) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf. In a Soviet-Finnish agreement of May 20, 1965, the parties made the shelf boundary in the Gulf of Finland co-terminus with the boundary of their respective territorial waters.2 3 The boundary of their shelf in the northeastern
part of the Baltic Sea, under an agreement of May 5, 1967, is a median
line. 24 Negotiations are in progress to demarcate the Soviet shelf boundary
with Norway. A Polish-Soviet agreement demarcating the continental shelf
boundary in the Gulf of Gdansk and the southeastern Baltic was signed
August 28, 1969, and ratified by the USSR on March 19, 1970.
The issue of delimiting the boundary of adjacent shelves came before the
International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases;

judgment was rendered in February, 1969. On October 23, 1968, surely by
no coincidence the same day on which the ICJ began to hear oral arguments in the Cases, the USSR, Poland and East Germany signed a joint
Declaration on the Continental Shelf of the Baltic Sea. The Declaration
provided that the "surface and subsoil of the bed of the Baltic ... are a

continuous continental shelf" whose delimitation must be carried out in
conformity with the "principles set forth in the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf and, in particular, Article 6 . .. "25 The base lines
used to compute the breadth of the territorial sea in conformity with the
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea were reciprocally recognized and
considered to be the base lines for delimiting the shelf, whose precise
coordinates were to be determined in bilateral or multilateral agreements
among the states concerned. In this manner the USSR communicated its
223

V. M. Chkhikvadze, et. at., Kurs mezhdunarodnogo prava v shesti tomakh 298

(1967).
236 Soviet Statutes & Decisions 264 (1970).
24

1bid. at 268.
at 261.

2-lbid.
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attitude toward the pending cases before the ICJ, and, as it turned out, the
substance of the dissenting opinion written by the Soviet judge.
The natural resources of the continental shelf are defined in the Convention on the Continental Shelf, and in the 1968 edict, as the "mineral and
other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil, as well as living
organisms belonging to sedentary species . . ." In the USSR these re-

sources are state property, and their exploration and exploitation must be
carried out in conformity with Soviet law.
On October 29, 1968, the Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR confirmed
a "List of Living Organisms Which Are Natural Resources of the Conti26
nental Shelf of the USSR" containing 52 species of marine life.
Reflecting its insistence at the 1958 Geneva Conference that crustacea
must be included in the concept of shelf resources, the Soviet list specified
Tanner and Alaska King Crabs, as well as other crab species on the USSR
continental shelf "except species which swim when mature." This formulation left some negotiating leeway to the Japanese, for whom the Alaska
King Crab gathered off the Kamchatka coasts has been an important
source of revenue and food.
The 1968 edict prohibited foreign aliens and companies from engaging in
research, exploration, and exploitation of natural resources, and in other
work on the Soviet continental shelf unless permission has expressly been
granted in an international agreement to which the USSR is party, or
unless competent Soviet authorities issue a special permit. In the Declaration on the Continental Shelf of the Baltic Sea the parties agreed not to
give over parcels of that shelf for exploration, exploitation or other use to
non-Baltic states, nationals or firms. In 1965, the USSR formally protested
against sea-bottom coring operations carried out by the US Coast Guard
icebreaker Northwind in the Kara Sea as violative of the Convention on
the Continental Shelf. Two years later, a request of the United States
Government to conduct research on the continental shelf beneath the polar
seas off the Soviet Coast was refused outright by the USSR.
Deep Seabed
The legal regime of the deep seabed is such a comparatively new and
complex issue that Soviet attitudes and policies, as those of other countries, are still in the process of gestation. A glance at a map of the Soviet
coastline, however, will show that the USSR faces difficult choices.
The so-called "national-lake" approach -extending the outer boundary
of the continental shelf seaward until it abuts the boundary of opposite
mlbid. at 282.
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states-has been labeled "absurd" by Soviet jurists. The USSR would
receive very little seabed area under such a scheme, and there is apprehension in Soviet legal media that such a division of the ocean bed would
effectively do away with the freedoms of the seas.
Soviet jurists also have objected to the extreme opposite of the national-lake theory: vesting title to the deep seabed in an international organization or authority. A supranational authority would be "inadvisable",
"incompatible with freedom of the seas", and would, in the opinion of
Soviet diplomats, "impair state cooperation in ocean exploration." 27 While
this view apparently would foreclose Soviet support for, or acquiescence
in, United Nations administration of the seabed, it would not necessarily
preclude Soviet participation in the creation of an international registry
authority, or analogous international arrangement with limited, specifically
defined, functions to regulate aspects of the deep seabed, so long as that
body were under the control of its sovereign member-states.
Rejection of the aforementioned theories leaves the "flag-state" approach, permitting each state to exploit and claim jurisdiction over areas of
the seabed as technology permits. Soviet publicists are not enthusiastic
about this approach either, fearing that the USSR may be at a severe
disadvantage if competition were unrestricted and that, moreover, this
approach would engender excessive interference with other uses of the
seas.
Consequently, Soviet diplomats have supported a "go-slow" approach
with regard to the development of a comprehensive seabed regime, and
have stressed that, in any event, a number of specific norms of international law already extend to the seabed. These norms must be taken
into consideration by any and all states using the seabed under whatever
regime.
Existing norms and principles are said to include: (1)the right to lay
submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the high seas, affirmed in
Article 26 of the Convention on the High Seas; (2) the right to engage in
"fisheries conducted by means of equipment embedded in the floor of the
sea" under circumstances specified in Article 13 of the Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas; (3)
the freedom of scientific research in the world ocean, including the seabed
and its resources; (4) respect for the legal rights and interests of other
states; and (5) respect for the generally recognized freedoms of the high
seas, including freedom of navigation and fishing. To these, Soviet jurists
would add the de-nuclearization of the seabed beyond a twelve-mile mari27

See S. Smirnov, "The Ocean and Law," Izvestia, January 7, 1970, p. 2; translated in 6
Soviet Statutes & Decisions 294 (1970).
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time zone, as provided in the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and
28
the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.
Conclusions
Marine developments of the past decade have brought the United States
and the Soviet Union closer together, on many basic issues of maritime
policy, than at any time in the past. The Soviet Union has abandoned its
open-ended formulations of the norm governing the breadth of territorial
waters, has insisted that twelve miles is the maximum limit, and would like
to convene a third conference on the law of the sea finally to resolve the
issue. The archipelago theory has become suspect in the Soviet view, and
there appears to be less resistance to a guarantee of innocent passage for
all vessels through international straits. The closed-sea and historic-waters
doctrines, for so long a prominent Soviet contribution to international legal
theory, are being relegated to the background. With regard to the continental shelf, the Soviet Government is deeply concerned about claims to the
shelf or seabed which would impinge upon the freedoms of the seas, and is
unwilling to recognize any claims to sovereign rights extending beyond the
geological continental shelf.
One would hope that all of this means that some of the vexing problems
of the law of the sea are growing more susceptible of solution. But proximity of interest is not identity. The paramount interest of the United States
Navy in the freedoms of the seas is not fully shared by the Soviet Navy.
Despite some impressive increase in capability, and a great deal of publicity, the Soviet Navy plays a comparatively modest role in Soviet strategic
doctrine; it is still oriented primarily to coastal defense and shows no
inclination to develop a "deep-blue" fleet. Soviet international lawyers
associated with the USSR Ministry of Defense seem less enthusiastic
about defending the freedoms of the high seas than do their colleagues
within the Soviet merchant marine and fishery ministries.
Expanding claims to the high seas could severely injure both American
and Soviet merchant shipping, but in fisheries the Soviet Union is much
more vulnerable than the United States. Indeed, the USSR Ministry of
Fisheries has emerged as the most vocal critic of claims to jurisdiction at
sea beyond twelve miles; while in the United States the sadly declining
east coast fishing industry is demanding protection from foreign competition.
It is still too early to judge the extent to which American and Soviet
interests in mining or oil extraction at sea may conflict. Soviet fishery
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interests are apprehensive about the pollution and obstruction likely to
accompany mining or oil operations, and one would suppose that Western
firms will show greater initiative than Soviet enterprises in commencing
such exploitation.
On the whole, however, American and Soviet approaches to the law of
the sea will probably continue to become less polarized than in the past,
and the prospects for cooperation in marine-related developments look
more promising than ever before.
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